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What is knowledge, according to postmodernism: re-cognition or creation? Does accepting all the existing synchronic and 
diachronic viewpoints weaken the need to undertake responsibility and become involved? Is putting things into perspective 
synonymous of no longer feeling responsible? What does the specificity of knowledge consist of in postmodernism? These are all 
questions to which our paper means to provide an answer by putting the relativist stance of postmodernism opposite the need of 
feeling it is incumbent upon oneself to play a part in creating the truth. In the author’s opinion, while rejecting the idea of a 
preexisting truth and the solutions based on the existence of incompatible truths, knowledge means assuming an attitude denoting 
confidence in the truth of a committing skepticism. Situated somewhere between Rorty and Popper, this paper militates for the 
truth recovery.
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Introduction
Pertaining to the larger field of research ethics, the topic of this paper does not aim to address the wrong use of 
sources made with intent, be it ingenuously or scornfully. By way of consequence, it will dwell neither on 
plagiarism nor on the legion of electronic references, this carnival of the current electronic globalism. They are 
neither research nor knowledge-related themes. I prefer to ask myself the question if nowadays knowledge implies 
making an ethical commitment and, should this be the case, what it consists in. More precisely, how can knowledge 
be possible in postmodernism (assuming that we acknowledge living in an age called by some “postmodern”). Is 
responsibility being undertaken by today’s scientist differently than it used to be one hundred years ago? Is the man 
of science still driven by the same deeply-held belief that knowing leads to progress and generates the good? In my 
view, these questions exceed the strict area of expertise of the critic, the literary historian or the literature professor, 
creating a context which first and foremost speaks to the scientist in the field of humanities. 
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Postmodernism, Richard Rorty and Karl Popper
In order to delineate the meanings attached to my linguistic tools, I shall start by asking myself “Does 
postmodernism really exist?” and not “What is Postmodernism?”. A challenging question, since it enables us to 
actually show what happens the moment we want to interpret the world we live LQ,Q2Y6&URKPăOQLFHDQX
wrote: “Besides the blatant contradiction in the nature of the peculiarities attributed to postmodernism, there is one 
more striking aspect. (It is the Loch Ness monster of contemporary criticism, an increasing number of individuals 
swearing having seen it with their own eyes, whilst providing totally different descriptions of its fabulous 
DSSHDUDQFH´ &URKPăOQLFHDQX7KHVHZRUGVEHVW H[SUHVV WKHGLVWUXVW RI DQ LPSRUWHG FRQFHSW VHHQDV
improper and deceptive. What is Postmodernism? A slightly nonconformist and rebellious master key if not “an 
academic business”, as it has been labeled. Highly fashionable for a few decades, it is said to have fed conferences, 
features in academic journals, symposiums and research directions. Nowadays there is a substantial bibliography on 
postmodernism, likely to exceed the Renaissance entries. Like a demon breathing in people’s souls, postmodernism 
is alleged to have emptied the reality of its own identity, converting it into fiction. The academic world is supposed 
to have obliged us to be or at least imagine we could be what we are not, bringing to the foreground a variable that 
triggered a strong state of instability and led to a crisis that affected even the generally-accepted values and truths. 
In his famous book first published in 1933 Marcel Raymond wrote that the “Symbolist movement was compared 
to the dragon of Alca, from the second book of Penguin Island; no one who claimed to have seen it could say what it 
looked like” (Raymond: 1949, 101). In a more recent book, The Enlightenment, Dorinda Outram asserts that there 
was “a great range of variation in ways of interpreting the Enlightenment”. (Outram: 1995, 33) Therefore, it was 
highly possible for two people in the same room to give three different opinions if asked to define it. This may be 
the reason why, in 1784, a long time after most of the Enlightenment works had been written (the Encyclopedia was 
published in France between 1751-1772), the Berlin Science Academy organized a contest of essays meant to 
provide an answer to the question Was ist Aufklärung? The competition would be won by Kant, his essay on the 
Enlightenment becoming one of the fundamental works for understanding modern Europe. Kant overlooks whatever 
may be interpreted as peculiar and irrelevant, building up a solid concept, giving a new full meaning to the 
contradictory labyrinthine reality. 
What is to be inferred from the fact that the postmodernism is said to exhibit almost the same characteristics as 
the Enlightenment or the Symbolism, two movements or periods in the history of Europe that nobody would even 
think of questioning nowadays? The answer comes naturally: the difficulty to see postmodernism, enhanced by the 
very fact that we belong to it, is not proof of its inexistence. We may not be able to make the monster of Loch Ness 
take shape out of our words; yet, we are definitely making history with and out of words, giving rise to particular 
phenomena, such as Symbolism and Enlightenment. These examples are to show that, without being hereby 
essentially betrayed (although it could undoubtedly be subject to betrayal), the past is our invention or, more 
precisely, our construct. Besides being a form of identifying something pre-established, the practice of drawing on 
the truth is also a matter of creativity. The world is a sum of widely-accepted conventions, specific to a particular 
cultural area; every now and then the essence of these conventions is put under scrutiny. At one point, the Dark 
Middle Ages became a bright story, just as the Renaissance is a story the Renaissance people were not aware of 
while living it. At one point the Earth became round or oval-shaped, started „pulsating” and was relegated to the 
position of a peripheral and (in certain respects) insignificant planet, just as the Union from 1601 of the Romanian 
Countries became the expression of the Romantic ideology. What we can infer from here is that, although drawing 
on the objective reality, the truth’s existence is confined within the limits of discourse. As matter of discourse, of 
discourse coherence more precisely, the act of knowing the truth cannot be conceived in terms of true or false. This 
topic is of course addressed in precise terms by linguists; nonetheless it exceeds the exact field of linguistics. 
To sum up, being discourse-related, the truth is dependent upon convention, consensus and pre-requisite. We all 
accept an image (which can be restrictive) until a new scientific breakthrough, that is until the next descent into the 
mater that will reveal itself to the human mind. Knowledge is putting together the synchronic or diachronic 
YLHZSRLQWV2QHRIWKHSRHPVZULWWHQE\1LFKLWD6WăQHVFXDQHRPRGHUQ5RPDQLDQSRHWUHDGV“From the point of 
view of trees / the sun is a band of heat […] // From the point of view of stones, / the sun is a falling stone […] // 
From the point of view of air, / the sun is air full of birds, / wing beating on wing” 6WăQHVFX, 23). The poem 
is appropriately entitled In Praise of People as the human being is capable of changing the viewpoints. While 
scientists VXFK DV %DVDUDE 1LFROHVFX RU &RQVWDQWLQ 9LUJLO 1HJRLĠă ZHUH DGYDQFLQJ LQ VFLHQFH RQ QRQ-Aristotelic 
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territories, N. 6WăQHVFXZDVZULWLQJWKHLogic of Vague Ideas. This can only highlight the greatness achieved by man
through knowledge. To draw a conclusion, conventions must be known and the founding ones must come first so 
that they could be the first to be shattered when subjected to critical reassessment. Yet the critical reassessment must 
not be understood as a purpose in itself. Actually, it only becomes possible after a convention has had its day; the 
perspective shift is dependent upon the individual only to a small extent.  
Going back to postmodernism, let us take a step back. There are grounds to state that postmodernism exists, just 
as there are grounds to argue it does not. As a result of the previous analogies, I conclude we are entitled at least to 
the certainty of its uncertainty, of its vagueness. I for one do believe postmodernism exists (even if there are still 
manifold views on it) for nowadays we can ask ourselves questions that some time ago could not even be thought of. 
And if they were envisaged, they did not take any shape; or they were far from being as sharp and accurate as they 
are today. Questions/wondering acts such as: Is the world built out of words and is the truth discourse?! When the 
empirical knowledge seems to provide us with certainties, how high can the degree of vagueness characterizing the 
world be? How is it possible for creation to outweigh identification in the process of gaining knowledge? And if
gaining knowledge is indeed an act of creation, why does it come as legitimating or power-related narrations?!
The answers given by me to these questions are only partly in the affirmative. To each of them I prefer to add the 
adverbial also. The truth is also discourse. There is also a high degree of vagueness about the world. Gaining 
knowledge is also an act of creation. Could this be a sign that I cannot part with the modern vision?! I feel that the 
very refusal to accept ideas that lie in handy, founded on irreconcilable positions, estranges me from it. Accepting 
the theory of the point of view, we can agree that the sun is a band of heat and a falling stone and air full of birds. 
Gone are the days when truths overlapped, excluding each other; we entered a time when all the truths are valid. 
Under these circumstances, how can knowledge be possible? What do we really know since the object of 
knowledge belongs to a fragile reality?! My debut book started with a debate on this very theme, in reference to the 
condition of the literary critic: „From the outset, the attempt to substitute synthetic concepts for concrete and life-
related facts is destined to failure Through abstraction it partly sterilizes a matter whose homogeneity is illusory; for 
irrespective of how many permanent and universal features certain phenomena (be they literary) may have 
objectively, each of them has its own irreducible identity. Out of epistemological needs that add up to didactic ones, 
the research makes use of the rigor of the scientific mind which, in its attempt at establishing a «norm», is at first 
dismissive of peculiarities only to be afterwards capable of undermining the «norm» by bringing forth peculiar 
details. It is actually this vicious circle (considered by us as absolutely necessary) that gives the pleasure of 
interpreting the facts related to literary history which come into shape only to be shattered by the continuous 
dynamics in which both the subject-receiver and the object are engaged.” (Diaconu: 1997, 5). At that time I was not 
familiar with Richard Rorty’s work. “The Enlightenment”, Rorty tells us, “wove much of its political rhetoric 
around a picture of the scientist as a sort of priest, someone who achieved contact with nonhuman truth” (Rorty: 
1989, 52). In this vision, there is one single objective truth existing beyond the human being. The modernity is 
deeply rooted in this idea which made the belief that progress does happen thrive. Hence the conviction that it is also 
possible to surpass oneself; this means drawing nearer to the truth, attaining it, stripping it bare of certain hypostases 
mankind used to believe in, but which, much to people’s surprise, turned out to be erroneous. Each new experience 
of gaining knowledge is synonymous of abolishing an error and coming into possession of “the objective truth”. 
Rorty also mentions that in postmodernism, “truth is rather created than discovered” (Rorty: 1989, 53). 
Could this dissociation between the truth of the moderns and the truth of the postmoderns actually reveal the old 
need of the scientific mind to simplify and synthesize by means of betraying the reality? Are we not in the presence 
of a convention, a fiction, a narration which, while legitimating a viewpoint, is actually building up the world? 
Should this amendment be valid, we are left with no certitude whatsoever concerning the difference between the 
Enlightenment/Modernism and Postmodernism. It then becomes a merely imagined and artificially constructed 
difference. To what extent does it prove to be true through gaining knowledge since it is at any moment liable to 
contradiction by other facts and visions?! Which is the liberty the postmodern scientist can take in creating the truth, 
since he draws on something that does not actually exist?  
While accepting that the truth is an act of creation, I cannot part with the idea that through creation I merely 
confirm an already-existing truth, which is not subject to any act of reception whatsoever. This is when I am 
overwhelmed with the fascination of the object existing beyond me, a fascination that can exert itself only as long as 
I lend myself to it. This blurs the difference between knowledge seen as a finding act and knowledge seen as
creating to such a degree that hypotheses are no longer incompatible and complement each other. 
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Converting understanding the world into creating the world seems to be one of the solutions suggested by the 
postmodern individual himself when confronted with the deadlock of modern knowledge. The modernists spoke 
about “the failure” of scientific knowledge. The optimistic position – based on the idea of progress – was often set 
off against a skeptical attitude. In Romania, Titu Maiorescu speaks as early as 1867 about the science which “knows 
no respite nor ending”, for “while there is no eternal limit to stop us, we are forever stopped by a limit”. More 
precisely, “science comes from a feature inherent to our mind which obliges us to meet any natural phenomenon 
with the two questions specific to the human being: why and to what effect?” (Maiorescu: 1967, 34-35) As 
Maiorescu puts it, the first effect will prove to be the cause of a new one, which in its turn will generate other effects 
and so on and so forth, all this leading to a limitless future. Likewise, going back in time, we find the first cause of a 
phenomenon to be the effect of another cause, which was the effect of a previous one, and so on, which makes the 
timeline unfold into an infinite past. This is how, driven by the aprioristic form of causality, mankind rises and 
descends, the old generation leaving to the new one the task to push Sisyphus’s boulder one step further. This is also 
how science progresses, for the first cause and the last effect cannot possibly be grasped by the human mind. Years 
afterwards, one the most complex minds of modern Europe, Paul Valéry, found that “philosophical and aesthetic
questions are so richly obscured by the quantity, diversity and antiquity of researches, arguments and solutions, all 
produced within the orbit of a very restricted vocabulary, of which each author uses the words according to his 
inclinations, that taken as a whole such works give me the impression of a district in the classical Underworld 
especially reserved for deep thinkers. Here are the Danaïdes, Ixions, Sisyphuses, eternally laboring to fill bottomless 
casks and to push back the falling rock that is to redefine the same dozen words whose combinations form the 
treasure of Speculative Knowledge.” (Valéry: 1939, 211). The fact that both Maiorescu and Valéry make mention of 
Sisyphus is indicative of the moderns’ consciousness of failure. 
What postmodernits did was to bring this idea to the foreground and surpass it. Postmodernism replaces both the 
optimistic vision, according to which truth can be attained, and the desperate one invoking Sisyphus, with the 
euphoria of relativism or the “euphoric nihilism”. A book on postmodernism written by a modern mind bears the 
title De la cuFXWăODFRFD-cola (From Hemlock to Coca-Cola) (Grigorescu, Dan: 1994). The metaphors in the title 
need no further explanation. Two human models face each other, where the euphoric nihilism – defined by coca-
cola – refers to relativism and irresponsibility. C. V. 1HJRLĠăVSHDNVDERXWVDOYDWLRQWKURXJKdelocalization, through 
pullback; breaking free from the system enables its contemplation. In a different context, such a pullback would
lead to the sublime; this is not the case with the postmodernists. The delocalization grants access to theories that 
follow one another, while the subject is aware that there is not one closer to the truth than the others. Moreover, 
although appearing to be incompatible, they actually complement one another. They each express a convention, the 
point of view specific to a particular cultural context. This implies putting into perspective the already-confirmed 
time-honored statements which does not mean diluting their consistency. Naturally, as opposed to the militantism 
and the beliefs of the moderns (that meant the exclusion of the others and the autarky of the self), this allows for 
tolerance, skepticism, relativism and irony, which express the capacity of the human mind to break away from its 
own self and contemplate the world from outside.  
What are the risks of delocalization feeling as if there was no more firm commitment to anything. Phenomena 
are understood through the contexts that generated them and are not judged. People understand the history of the 
“truths” and place them all in a sort of simultaneity; they see how the latest truths are modifying the primary object:
reality, which is no longer certain, absolute, solid. It is ever changing, never identical to itself; hence the decreasing 
number of people willing to be burned at the stake or drink hemlock. More and more of us are drinking coca-cola.
Like a modern who finds things particularly clear, although he is not one, R. Rorty proposes a clear-cut 
opposition between the metaphysicist and the ironist. There are actually two camps facing each other: those making 
history and those contemplating it, those living in the system and those who broke out of it; the militant and the 
skeptic, the one who believes in an objective world and the one who believes that “All things are subject to 
interpretation”, as Nietzsche put it. Miles away from the science that undertakes responsibility, there is the “merry 
science”. Resorting to wider categories, I would call the metaphyisicist a modern, while the ironist is a postmodern. 
The former is conservatory, the latter, liberal. The former is right-wing, the latter left-wing. In Enlightenment terms, 
the former is a monarchist, the latter a republican. Monarchy means certitude, meaning, transcendence. The right 
values of the monarchy are: land, God, country, truth; by comparison, the individual is irrelevant. In the republic,
the decisions are taken by vote; hence it means democracy, matter, concrete, chance; lack of certainty, fortune. The 
focus is on the individual. To the former category, history means transcendence. To the latter, it is pure chance. 
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Some live fervently with hemlock by their bedside, the others live rejoicing, a bottle of coca-cola within easy reach. 
Or we often see chance take the form of transcendence. Even if we hear about history defatalisation (as if what 
happened could have known a different turn of events), once occurred, the facts enter a right-wing logic. This is a 
way to overcome incompatibilities. In my view, this is the core of Postmodernism. To my surprise, the
Enlightenment philosophers, the moderns’ parents, and the post-moderns (ironists) are left-wing. The 
Enlightenment philosophers militated for human rights, democracy, the republic. The difference is in that they 
endowed reason with all the rights, while the ironist’s reason is defensive, retractile, recessive. Although this may 
seem a mere detail, the difference is fundamental. Hence, is Rorty’s dissociation according to which in the 
Enlightenment “the scientist is a sort of priest: who achieved the contact with the truth”, while in Postmodernism 
“the truth is rather created than found” still valid? Since we can ask this question, we have one more proof that, 
although we are in the same room (with Rorty), our views on the Enlightenment and Postmodernism still diverge. 
Conclusions: the Postmodern Solution
I find the ironist’s solution (as opposed to the metaphyisicist’s), deconstructing and unnerving. This is why the 
ironist/postmodern is associated with irresponsibility, relativism, demythologization. Although I do not believe in 
permanent truths, in the heroic position of the scientist, in the monarchist’s fanaticism, I cannot accept that our 
involvement is no longer possible and does not matter. I think Karl Popper was right in saying that “relativism is 
one of the numerous crimes of the intellectuals. It betrays reason and mankind” (Popper: 1998, 14), the same Karl 
Popper who militated for “the rehabilitation of the correspondence theory of truth” (Popper: 1972, 90). So I cannot 
accept that the relativism gives no chance to getting involved. How could anyone fight, the ironist wonders, when 
they know that all they propose is language? Only for hedonism’s sake, to satisfy his subject, vanities or pleasures?! 
I have seen serious people seeming to state serenely that the truth does not exist. The mere fact of building it means 
it exists. Actually, this is how it comes into being even if its circumstantial existence, acknowledged as contextual, 
is fleeting. The ironist knows that we are devoured by history, but (if I may say so) the truth is that history is in need 
of our militantism. There is no other possibility to feed it besides serving the truth, aware as we may be that it is 
only illusory. Is this proof that there are neither sheer ironists nor metaphysicists? I do not think so. While the 
metaphyisicist knows in the name of mankind, the ironist knows first and foremost for himself. Knowledge is seen 
as a founding exercise. We witness a new kind of lebensphilosophie. Personally I prefer an involving scepticism to 
a hedonistic optimism, an involving scepticism that has assimilated hedonism. I thus militate for trusting the hard 
truth, assuming this belief and serving it unconditionally. I disown both the blind militantism and irresponsible 
relativism. Contemplating the truth hypotheses is only possible if we put our trust in it, believe it is one and worthy
of any sacrifice. Sacrificing for it is really a sacrifice for the good. This is K. Popper’s position to which I subscribe.
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